With this apparatus in hand, Digeser considers three themes integral to “how it matters to politics.” One is whether friendship can serve, as so many have argued, as a model for citizenship, above all as a source of political unity. The instrumental purposes assigned friendship, even community or solidarity, are not central, the author argues; cooperation does not require it. And civic friendship would require not only stripping it of intimacy and emotion, as some proponents admit; on Digeser’s account, friendship, civic or not, requires mutual recognition of motives—an impossibility outside of some strictly bounded ideal community. What friendship can do is offer an ideal of citizenship “that bonds partisans and can bridge political differences” (p. 142). This conclusion seems to go beyond Digeser’s sensible notion that, of course, friends do civic stuff. It seems as much a friendly concession to the many theorists who want, somehow, to bring unity and reciprocity to public life by way of friendship, as is borne out by her own critical arguments.

The author’s second charge is to consider the political conditions that derange friendship. The emphasis is on friendship as a sanctuary from and protection against the state, and as a potential resource for political opposition. Another argument that complements the author’s overall position is Arendt’s notion of friendship as a preserve of pluralism in the face of totalism. The discussion of “friendship during dark times” ends with the thought that the author’s ideal of self-enactment operates beyond the reach of the political. In this chapter especially, something beyond careful parsing seemed necessary—some narrative of the wrenching torque between friendship and politics in regimes that see private relations as subversive and where friends can turn treacherous.

What about friendship and political institutions in stable states? Fairness and impartiality argue against room for friendship in the operation of liberal institutions, though the author allows for it in the appointment process for some offices where, in addition to qualification, trust and loyalty are crucial (the book antedates the Trump administration.) Domination and gendered hierarchies chill friendship, she shows. Should the state encourage a “law of friendship” by extending to it the privilege of privacy, duty of confidentiality, and more? A rich legal literature debates whether friends should have the privileges of kin, and Digeser is ambivalent about a “law of friendship,” for reasons she lays out. Would the legally recognized commitment to take medical leave to care for friends, for example, lead to a change in the usual expectations and practices of friendship? Should it?

Finally, international friendship, meaning friendship between nations, takes up a third of the book, and the author’s liberalism emerges plainly here. Friendship among nations is not reducible to partnership or alliance, which are motivated by self-interest or security concerns. Interstate friendship, rightly understood, is motivated by a mutual desire to promote and protect one another’s just institutions and policies. Grounded in John Rawls’s *The Law of Peoples* (1999), Digeser speaks of “international friendships of character”: cooperation that goes beyond mutual utility and that incorporates mutual recognition of motives and the adverbial condition of acting justly toward one another (she adds other adverbs: interacting confidently, trustingly, presumptuously, boldly). She suggests that aspirationally, international friendship would generate a different quality of international politics.

Throughout, the author fashions a middle ground: “The goal of this work is to carve out a position between whole-hearted endorsement and complete rejection of friendship as a political concern” (p. XIII). After all the parsing and analysis, the sober but generous interpretation of a host of writers and arguments, Digeser has earned her skepticism: skepticism when it comes to the sentimental and often diffuse aspiration to find in friendship something modern life has lost; skepticism when it comes to modeling citizenship and civic action; skepticism when it comes to government relying on or fostering friendship. The part left for friendship in politics is modest and mainly precautionary, and the part for politics in friendship is slim—which is not to say that personally and individually, friendship is not shaped by politics in practice.

The author comes to comparatively modest positions by making her way, step by step, through a literature that is philosophically complex and at the same time immune to our strong feelings about friends and politics. The final line of the book is true to her pluralist sensibility: “There is no one true friendship. There are, however, true friendships” (p. 281).

**Breaking Democracy’s Spell.** By John Dunn. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014. 208pp. $35.00

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— Christopher Hobson, Waseda University

The election of Donald Trump shocked many pundits and forecasters. It likely came as less of a surprise to the growing number of political theorists who have been emphasizing the significant dysfunctions, failings, and gaps that mark contemporary democracy. John Dunn and Ian Shapiro are two scholars who have spent much of their careers reflecting on such matters, and their new books offer important insights for thinking about democracy’s prospects. Both are framed by a strong sense that our world is in flux and the political institutions that have provided a modicum of freedom and order are under increasing strain. Of the two, Shapiro’s text is much more structured and systematic, compared with Dunn’s, which
reflects the lecture format in which it was first prepared and presented at Yale University.

Breaking Democracy’s Spell is somewhat of an informal follow-up to Dunn’s 2005 book, Setting the People Free: The Story of Democracy, which offered a contrasting narrative to the one commonly associated with Francis Fukuyama’s End of History. Dunn has instead sought to demystify democracy, stressing the centrality of historical contingency and seeking to counter excessive confidence in its virtues. In this new work, he continues his efforts, urging us to “distinguish better a (predominantly) happy accident from a magic formula” and arguing that “this faith in the vindicatory and directive force of our conception of democracy is utterly misplaced: (p. 5). The lecture structure that served as the basis of this book is both a strength and a weakness. It allows for a natural flow of ideas and is enjoyable to read. The downside is that the argument largely stays at a sufficiently general level that it becomes difficult to fully work through many of his claims.

As in his previous work, Dunn successfully captures the beguiling and slippery nature of the concept of democracy, which over time has taken on a range of different—and sometimes competing—meanings. For him, our tendency to romanticize democracy, to be fooled by its charms, means that Western societies have become overly confident and complacent, leaving them ill-prepared for the massive political, economic, social, and environmental problems that are becoming increasingly pressing. One of the points that Dunn stresses is the danger of confusing democracy with good government: The two can go together, but it is deeply mistaken to regard them as synonyms. From this perspective, Brexit and Trump’s victory are hardly a surprise. There is nothing about democracy than ensures good outcomes or smart decisions. Rather, “We the People are the nefarious and the foolish every bit as much as the fine and the wise. When we choose badly, we have no one to blame but ourselves” (p. 45). The author is at his strongest when reminding us of this.

Dunn chops democracy down to size, offering a much less inspiring explanation for its current preeminence. He suggests that it has as much to do with the failure of alternate ways of justifying and exercising rule as it does with the virtues specific to it. He concludes that “we should not see democracy’s global ascent as a stunning triumph of credulity or a majestic forward march of justified true belief, but simply as an uneven, reluctant, painful series of surrenders of an immense miscellany of other kinds of belief” (p. 43). While Dunn is certainly justified in warning us against being overly confident in democracy, he risks pushing too far in the opposite direction. He is correct in rallying against a simplistic belief in democracy’s value and strength, but this is not as big a problem as it was in the years immediately following the fall of the Berlin Wall. Whereas Setting the People Free appeared at a time when the sun was still setting on the liberal zeitgeist of the 1990s, there has been a marked shift in mood following the disastrous “Global War on Terror,” combined with the 2008 financial crisis and the ensuing Eurozone mess. In this regard, Dunn’s contribution feels a bit behind the times. Even before Brexit and Trump, there was far less confidence and faith in democracy compared to the 1990s. The more pressing intellectual task is this: If we accept that democracy is a much more flawed, uneven, and contingent form of rule, how can it be adapted and strengthened to respond to the manifold problems it now faces? On this, the author has less to say, which is a shame, given his uncanny ability to reveal vital aspects of democracy’s character.

In Politics Against Domination, Shapiro’s approach of “adaptive political theory” offers more promise in terms of tangible ways forward in response to the challenges facing democracy. In comparison to Dunn’s emphasis on downplaying democracy’s virtues, Shapiro is sensitive to the need for it to inspire, noting that “people need grounds to believe that they will be better protected over time by democracy than by the going alternatives, even though there is no certainty about this” (p. 17). The author starts with the institutions we currently have—rather than what would ideally be in place—and considers how these could be refashioned and improved. Some of the strongest parts of the book are Shapiro’s reflections on the limits of possibility and on the need for theorizing that responds to the world we have inherited.

At the heart of this book is an argument for non-domination as a foundational principle for informing political action and institutions. Eschewing a more abstract conception, Shapiro explains that “rather than try to escape domination as such, people try to escape instances of domination that they experience or by which they feel threatened” (p. 5). And compared to the alternatives, he argues that majority-based democracy offers the best institutional mechanisms for nondomination within the state (p. 177). He builds his argument empirically by reflecting on a series of important issues shaping democracy primarily as it exists in the United States, such as special interests, economic inequality, the role of the Supreme Court, and the role of parties.

Looking beyond the state, Shapiro argues that “democratic options are not available internationally, but stop the bully without becoming one is available” (p. 180). In the preface, Shapiro notes that the two chapters of the book dealing with global challenges were not originally planned but were later deemed necessary in working through his case for nondomination. While certainly correct in observing that there are many issues above the state that are relevant, he is clearly at his strongest when in the realm of state-centered political theory. The chapters “against world government” and on “resisting domination against borders” are less convincing compared to the rest of
the book. In the latter chapter, Shapiro’s critique of George W. Bush’s foreign policy repeats what is now basically the commonsense conclusion about the mistaken response to 9/11. Likewise, he points toward the 2011 Libyan intervention as a case of humanitarian overstretch, with the country now in far worse condition than in the period immediately prior to NATO’s intervention. In both cases, the conclusions he draws are sensible, realist ones with which most commentators, except for neo-conservatives and liberal hawks, would agree.

That Shapiro ends up relying heavily on George Kennan reflects that much of what he is suggesting matches with what realists have already worked through in much greater detail. In this sense, it is unclear what exactly his nondomination framework adds when international issues are considered. It would have been easier to appreciate the contribution had Shapiro engaged more with the relevant international relations literature. Notably missing are references to work that seems particularly pertinent to his argument, especially Barry Posen’s Restraint (2014) and Daniel Deudney’s Bounding Power (2007).

Present in both books is an underlying sense that things can—and may likely—get worse, but that what lies beyond our political horizon is not yet determined. At the end of his book, Shapiro notes that “I have made the case for an adaptive approach to combating domination that takes account of political reality without capitulating to it. The hardest questions for this view concern knowing what the limits of the possible are, and how best to push against them” (p. 182). This dilemma has become even more pressing in the present context, where systemic forces seem to be continually reducing the scope for agency, and much of the agency we do see is actually leading in a direction likely to increase domination and reduce freedom. In this regard, Trump’s victory was a remarkable case of agency overcoming structure, but the likely consequences look overwhelmingly bad from the perspective adopted by these two authors. If Dunn warns us off being fooled by democracy’s charms, Shapiro gives us strong reasons why democracy should be defended and cultivated further.

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— Robert W. T. Martin, Hamilton College

Social historians have spent the last several decades looking beyond traditional figures and major constitutional questions in their ongoing reassessments of American history. A few political theorists have drawn on these sources to examine less well-known thinkers or, as in the book reviewed here, to return to well-known figures with new questions. That the founding generations’ view of economic inequality has until now received little focused attention is telling; our new Gilded Age has been decades in the making and class inequality has reached troubling levels, but only relatively recently have scholars, politicians, and the broader public begun to think seriously about the issue. A long-standing obstacle has been the peculiarly American postwar reluctance to discuss class politics and economic inequality. Yet “if attacking large disparities between rich and poor constitutes a form of class warfare,” as Clement Fatovic’s important new book demonstrates, “then the struggle against economic inequalities is arguably the longest-running war in American history” (p. xvii).

“Looking to the founders for answers to contemporary political problems is always a risky enterprise” (p. 275), as Fatovic well knows, and historians will likely criticize the presentism that animates the current work. But given how often famous Founders are used and misused in contemporary economic debates, this is an important contribution of the book. The author strikes a commendable balance between contemporary issues and historical interests.

Fatovic does an excellent job of showing that economic inequality was a long-standing and significant concern in late eighteenth-century America. Early Americans disagreed about many issues, yet “hardly anyone questioned the pursuit of economic equality as a legitimate political consideration” (p. xix). Indeed, most of the Founders saw significant inequality as a threat to popular government and political freedom. In three separate chapters, we see that major thinkers like Thomas Jefferson and Thomas Paine reflected very seriously about the need for controlling inequality; even Alexander Hamilton saw it as a concern. And as Fatovic shows in a careful parsing of archival records in another chapter, the early Congresses tried to avoid increasing preexisting or market-derived inequality.

Most generally, while we today worry about creating people a dependence on government largesse, the founding generation was concerned about poverty and inequality leading to “private relations of dependence” that would undermine popular political engagement (pp. 262–63). This principle, however, was most often honored in the breach. Congressional efforts at alleviating poverty and minimizing inequality, Fatovic concedes, “failed more often than [they] succeeded” (p. 161).

With his careful research scouring the congressional records and the papers of Hamilton, Jefferson, and Paine, Fatovic does a valuable and necessary service, bringing to light aspects of these sources that are widely overlooked both by scholars and lay commentators. Yet he is forced to dig so methodically in part because inequality was not as central an issue as he sometimes suggests. To be sure, government action to control economic inequality was more acceptable to early Americans than it is now. Contrary to our blithe acceptance of economic inequality,
matter of individual choice that can neither be imposed from above nor accepted on the basis of tradition or custom alone. As Locke argued in the Letter on Toleration or Moses Mendelssohn in Jerusalem, religion at least true religion is a matter of individual conscience and private belief and as such cannot be produced through the coercive power of law. Documents Similar To Book Reviews on Secularism - Political Theory.